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Abstract
In this paper we use a non cooperative equilibrium selection approach as a notion of stability
in link formation games. Speciﬁcally, we follow the global games approach ﬁrst introduced
by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), to study the robustness of the set of Nash equilibria
for a class of link formation games in strategic form with supermodular payoﬀ functions.
Interestingly, the equilibrium selected is in conﬂict with those predicted by the traditional
cooperative reﬁnements. Moreover, we get a conﬂict between stability and eﬃciency even
when no such conﬂict exists with the cooperative reﬁnements. We discuss some practical
issues that these diﬀerent theoretical approaches raise in reality. The paper also provides
an extension of the global game theory that can be applied beyond network literature.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The way that diﬀerent agents interact has an important role in the outcome of many
problems in economics and other social sciences. Recently, these interactions have
been modeled using network structures or graphs, where the agents are represented by
n o d e sa n dt h ea r c sb e t w e e nn o d e sr e p r e s e n ts o m es p e c i ﬁc kind of relation between the
corresponding agents. This approach has proved to be successful in the study of many
speciﬁcp r o b l e m s , 1 however, we do not have a unique and accepted theory to explain
how the networks form, which properties they have in terms of social welfare and how
robust are some results in speciﬁce n v i r o n m e n t sw h e ns o m eo ft h ea s s u m p t i o n sa r e
slightly modiﬁed. It is well known in the literature that, in general, a link formation
game in strategic form can lead to the formation of multiple networks supported
by multiple Nash equilibria. Even more, under some particular circumstances, any
network can be supported by a Nash equilibrium of the game.2 The use of traditional
reﬁnements is limited and depends on the details of the game, consequently, some
stability notions have been used in order to reﬁne the set of equilibria.
The stability notions used so far to reﬁne the set of Nash equilibria in a link
formation game have been based on cooperative game theory. The most prominent of
them, from the strongest to the weakest, have been Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE),
Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) and Pairwise Stability (PS). However,
the applicability of these reﬁnements lies critically on the feasibility of cooperation
among agents. This assumptions may be too strong for a link formation game when,
by deﬁnition, the network has not been formed.3
1For an excelent review of the main issues in network theory see Dutta and Jackson (2001) and
Jackson (2001).
2See, for example, Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000).
3The feasibility of cooperation seems more appealing once the network has been formed and the
agents interact among them.
2In this paper we use a non cooperative4 equilibrium selection approach as a no-
tion of stability in link formation games. Speciﬁcally, we follow the Global Games
approach pioneered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993),5 to study the robustness
of the set of Nash equilibria for a class of link formation games with supermodular
payoﬀ functions. In order to ilustrate this approach, let us suppose that Gx is a
standard game of complete information where the payoﬀs depend on a parameter
x ∈ IR , and also suppose that for some subset of the parameter x, Gx has a strict
Nash equilibrium. Rather than observing the parameter x, suppose instead that each
player observes a private signal xi = x + σεi where σ>0 is an scale factor and εi is
a random variable with density φ.D e n o t e t h i s “ p e r t u r b e d g a m e ” b y Gx(σ),a n d
let NE(Gx) and BNE(Gx(σ)) denote the sets of Nash and Bayesian Nash equilibria
of the unperturbed and perturbed games, respectively. Equilibrium selection is ob-
tained when limσ→0BNE(Gx(σ)) is smaller than NE(Gx).C a r l s s o na n dv a nD a m m e
(1993) show, in fact, that for two-player, two-action games, this limit comprises a
single equilibrium proﬁle, and is obtained through iterated deletion of strictly domi-
nated strategies. Recently these results have been extended by Frankel, Morris and
Pauzner (2002) for games with many players and many actions, but it is limited to
the case of games with strategic complementarities.
This paper extends the global game results to games with vector valued space of
actions, such that each component of a player´s vector strategy represents a binary
decision. Even though the application to a link formation game is very natural, our
extension can be applied to other problems beyond the network literature. Therefore,
in particular, this binary decision can be seen as player’s intention of establishing a
4The non cooperative formation of networks has been studied in the literature by Bala and Goyal
(2000), however, their approach is very diﬀerent from ours, because the non cooperative notion in
that paper is related with the possibility to establish links unilaterally, whithout the agreement of
the partner. On the contrary, our model is in the tradition that the existence of a link requires both
parties to agree.
5For an excellent desciption and survey of the ensuing literature see Morris and Shin (2002)
3link with other player. A link will be formed if and only if both players want to form
the link. Any Nash equilibria of this game will support a diﬀerent network.
We study a general class of games where the link formation process follows the
strategic form of Dutta, van den Noweland, and Tijs (1998),6 such that if the payoﬀ
is parametrized by x, our main assumptions are: 1. Increasing Diﬀerences: player
i’s incentive to choose a higher action is non decreasing in the others players’ action
proﬁle. 2. Link Symmetry: player i’s incentive to choose an action depends on
the number of links requested by each player and on the structure of the resulting
network, but not on the identities of the players. 3. Existence of upper and lower
dominance regions:f o r s u ﬃciently low (high) values of the parameter, the action
vector such that shows link intention with nobody (everybody) is strictly dominant.
Under these assumptions, and some technical requirements, we prove that there
exists a unique equilibrium proﬁle surviving iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies. The proﬁle selected is independent of the noise size. The equilibrium
strategy deﬁnes a unique k∗ such that ∀xi <k ∗ each player chooses the action vector
showing link intention with nobody, and ∀xi >k ∗ each player chooses the action
vector showing link intention with everybody.
T h es e l e c t e dB a y e s i a nN a s hp r o ﬁle is in conﬂict with those arising from the appli-
cation of traditional cooperative reﬁnements of the network literature: SNE, CPNE
and PS. This diﬀerence shows that the cooperative notions of stability are not robust
to incomplete information. Moreover, we show that the stability notions based on co-
operative reﬁnements do not conﬂict with eﬃciency in our class of payoﬀ functions,
however, the equilibrium selected under the global game approach does conﬂict. These
diﬀerences raise some practical questions about which criteria should be satisﬁed by
6The strategic form approach of the link formation game was ﬁrst proposed by Myerson (1991).
The idea is that each player select a list of the other players he wants to form a link with. Then the
lists are put together and if the link ij is required by both parts then it is formed.
4networks that form in reality.
From an applied point of view, the paper highlights the importance of two stan-
dard assumptions in the link formation literature. First, the assumption of complete
information can be the origin of the multiplicity of networks supported by Nash
Equilibria in link formation games. This multiplicity disappears when we perturb
the game introducing incomplete information. Second, the cooperative reﬁnements
have been used symmetrically to reﬁne the multiplicity of equilibria in a link for-
mation game and to argue that an existing network is stable to some cooperative
deviations. However, the possibility of cooperation among coalitions of agents seems
to be a more demanding assumption when the network is in formation than when the
agents are maintaining or modifying an existing network. These observations raise
some doubts about which is the pertinent equilibrium selection criteria in reality for
a link formation game.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a simple example where
we can show intuitively the main ﬁndings of the paper. Section 3 presents some
basic background and notation in network theory which will be useful throughout the
paper. In section 4 we describe our link formation game and we introduce the general
class of supermodular payoﬀ functions under study. Sections 5 introduces the most
commonly used cooperative reﬁnements and their application to our game. In section
6 we develop the alternative approach to equilibrium selection using the global game
theory. In section 7 we specialized our payoﬀ function in order to get some intuition
about the results. The main conclusions are contained in sections 8. Finally, proofs
of propositions are relegated to the appendix.
52 An Illustrative Example
The idea of this section is to provide a simple example and an intuitive explanation of
t h em a i nr e s u l t sd e v e l o p e di nt h ep a p e r .W ea r en o tg o i n gt ob ef o r m a la n dt e c h n i c a l
details are postponed to next sections.
Consider a link formation game of complete information G with three players, where
the set of strategies for each player i is given by Ai = {0,1}2 .As t r a t e g yf o rp l a y e ri
is a two component column vector of zeros and ones which identiﬁes the set of players
he wants to form links with. A link between two players will be formed if and only if
both players want to form the link. For example, if the strategies of the players are
ai =( aij =1 ,a ik =1 ) t,a j =( aji =0 ,a jk =1 ) t, ak =( aki =0 ,a kj =1 ) t, then only
the link jk is created.7 The payoﬀ function for player i is deﬁned by:
πi = aijaji(x + ajkakjβx)+( αx − c)aij + aikaki(x + akjajkβx)+( αx − c)aik (1)
The variable x deﬁnes a level of proﬁts which is assumed to be non negative, and
c is a ﬁxed parameter that represents a level of investment incurred by agent i for
each link he wants to form. This investment is quasi speciﬁc to the partners, in the
sense that if agent i incurs an investment to agent j,t h e ne v e ni fj does not perform
the reciprocal investment, and consequently the link ij is not formed, agent i receives
ar e t u r n(αx−c). The source of beneﬁts αx is independent of other players’ actions,
in the sense that it can be obtained no matter the strategies the other players are
following. On the other hand, if j also performs the quasi speciﬁc investment to i
then the return to agent i increases to (x+αx−c). In other words, there is an extra
direct beneﬁt x from connection with each potential partner. Finally, agent i proﬁts
7Note that the superscript t stands for transpose.
6from the relation between j and k when they are connected and provided that i is
connected with at least one of them. Note that if i is connected with both of them,
this indirect beneﬁt is duplicated. For example, in the complete network the total
payoﬀ for player i is given by πi =2 [ x(1 + α + β) − c]. In this sense, βx represent
an indirect beneﬁt or spillover that agent i is able to extract from the connection
between his partners and their partners. It seems natural to assume that 1 >α>0,
1 >β>0, because we are scaling the beneﬁts in relation to those obtained from
reciprocity (x).
One case where this kind of payoﬀ function can be justiﬁed is in investment in
R&D to reduce variable costs. In such a case, it has been empirically documented (see
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001)) that the ﬁrms tend to form alliances in pairs,
represented by the links, but any reduction in cost obtained by i’s partners can be
imitated by i, no matter if such reduction was obtained due to R&D of i’s partner or
by a partner of i’s partners. We can assume that these ﬁrms are not competitors in
any ﬁnal market, so no negative externalities from R&D will arise.
2.1 The Nash Equilibria
Given the symmetry of the problem we are going to consider the best response cor-
respondence for player 1. This correspondence, and the Nash equilibria arising, are
diﬀerent depending on the values of x. Figure 1 provides a summary of the diﬀerent
network structures supported by Nash equilibria, NE(G),f o rd i ﬀerent values of x.
Consider the following cases:






then the best response correspondence is given by:
7BR1(a−1)=

      
      
a12 =1 ,a 13 =1 if a21 = a31 =1
a12 =1 ,a 13 =0 if a21 =1 ,a 31 =0
a12 =0 ,a 13 =1 if a21 =0 ,a 31 =1
a12 =0 ,a 13 =0 if a21 =0 ,a 31 =0
Note that, in this region, the strategies of agents 2 and 3 in relation to their
connection does not aﬀect the best response correspondence of agent 1. The intuition
is that direct connections are enough to guarantee proﬁtability. This characteristic
leads to a multiplicity of Nash equilibria and, even more, it is possible to prove that all
the feasible networks among the three agents can be supported by a Nash equilibrium.






then the best response correspondence is given by:
BR1(a−1)=

      
      
a12 =1 ,a 13 =1 if a21 = a31 = a23 = a32 =1
a12 =1 ,a 13 =0 if a21 = a23 = a32 =1 ,a 31 =0
a12 =0 ,a 13 =1 if a21 =0 ,a 31 = a23 = a32 =1
a12 =0 ,a 13 =0 otherwise
Note that, in this case, the best response correspondence of player 1 is aﬀected
by the existence of the link between players 2 and 3. It is possible to prove that
in this case only the empty and the complete network can be supported as a Nash
equilibrium of the game.
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Figure 1: Network Structures supported by Nash Equilibria
i is to play ai =( 0 ,0)t ≡ 0. Analogously, when x>x = c/α a dominant strategy
is to form links with all the other players ai =( 1 ,1)t ≡ 1, leading to the complete
network.
2.2 Equilibrium Selection using Cooperative Reﬁnements
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle is called a Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE) if it is a Nash equilib-
rium and there is no coalition of players that can strictly increase the payoﬀso fa l l
its members using a joint deviation (Aumann (1959)). On the other hand, a strategy
proﬁle is called a Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) if, as in an SNE, no
coalition can deviate to a proﬁle that strictly improves the payoﬀs of all the players
in the coalition. However, in the CPNE the set of admissible deviations is smaller,
because the deviation has to be stable with respect to further deviations by subcoali-
tions. Finally, a network is Pairwise Stable (PS) if no pair of agents has incentives
to form or sever one link. A more formal treatment of this concepts is postponed to
section 5.
The application of these cooperative reﬁnements to our three players game G
is very direct and a summary of results for the network supported by SNE(G),
CPNE(G) and PS(G) is given in ﬁgure 2.
9First, it is possible to prove that, in this particular example, SNE(G) coincides
with CPNE(G). Second, the analysis has to be performed in separated areas. It
is easy to see that the strategy proﬁle a =( 0,0,0) ≡ [0] is a SNE(G) when x<
c/(1 + α + β), because for this range of values each agent plays 0 as a dominant
strategy and, consequently, no coalition of agents can improve upon.8 On the other
hand, a =( 1,1,1) ≡ [1] is a SNE(G) when c/(1 + α + β) <x . The intuition is
that the grand coalition playing ai = aj = ak = 1 (which is a Nash equilibrium)
can improve upon any other strategy proﬁle (Nash equilibrium or not) given the
complementarities involved in the payoﬀ functions and the fact that a positive payoﬀ
is guaranteed.
We have to be more careful in the analysis of pairwise stability. If c/(1+α+β) <
x<c / (1 + α) t h e nt h ee m p t ya n dt h ec o m p l e t en e t w o r k sa r ep a i r w i s es t a b l ea n d
consequently, pairwise stability does not reﬁne the set of Nash equilibria. This result
is a consequence that for these low values of x the indirect connections are needed to
make any connection proﬁtable so, if nobody is making links, an agreement of two
players to form a link is not enough to obtain a proﬁtable relationship. On the other
hand, if everybody is making links then no pair of agents beneﬁt sf r o ms e v e r i n gal i n k .
When c/(1+α) <x<c / αany pair of agents which are not connected can proﬁtably
make a link and, consequently, only the complete network is pairwise stable. Finally,
if x<c / (1 + α + β) then action ai = 0 is a dominant strategy for player i and the
unique pairwise stable network is the empty one. Analogously, if x>c / αthen action
ai = 1 is a dominant strategy and the unique pairwise stable network is the complete
one.
8In what follows [0] and [1] represents a matrix full of zeros or ones respectively. The dimension-
ality is given by the proﬁle they are representing. For example, in this three players case, a =[ 0] is
a 2x3 matrix of zeros representing a complete strategy proﬁle and a−i =[ 0] is a 2x2 matrix of zeros
representing a strategy proﬁle, which excludes player i’s strategy.
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Figure 2: Network structures supported by Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE), Coalition
Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) and Pairwise Stability (PS)
2.3 Equilibrium Selection using the Global Game Approach
Suppose now we allow some arbitrary amount of incomplete information in the payoﬀ
structure such that instead of observing the actual value of the level of proﬁts x,
each player just observes a private signal xi, which contains diﬀuse information about
x. T h es i g n a lh a st h ef o l l o w i n gs t r u c t u r e :xi = x+σεi, where σ>0 is a scale factor,




with uniform density and εi is an independent realization of
the density φ with support in [−1
2, 1
2]. We assume εi is i.i.d. across the individuals.9
In this context of incomplete information, a Bayesian pure strategy for player iis
af u n c t i o nsi :[ X − σ
2,X + σ
2] → Ai, and s =( s1,s 2,s 3) is a pure strategy proﬁle,
where si ∈ Si. Calling this game of incomplete information G(σ), let us deﬁne as
BNE(G(σ)) the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of G(σ).
Proposition 1: ∀ σ>0 there exists a unique strategy proﬁle s∗, that survives







1 if xi >k ∗
0 if xi <k ∗
∀ia n d k
∗ =
4c
2+4 α + β
9Note that φ need not be symmetric around the mean nor even have zero mean.
11Since the noise structure is xi = x + σεi, as σ → 0 xi → x, thus the unique
equilibrium selected implies that ∀ x<k ∗ all agents play the action 0,s ot h ee m p t y
network is formed, and ∀ x>k ∗ all the agents playing action 1 and, consequently, the
complete network is formed. Conditional on the signal, ﬁgure 3 shows the networks
supported by this equilibrium as the noise goes to zero.
This proposition is a particular case of proposition 4 (many players case), so we
are not going to give a formal proof here. Instead, we are going to discuss the intuition
behind the proposition. Consider players 2 and 3 using any strategy. It is common
knowledge of the game that these strategies must consider playing the actions 0 and
1 in the previously identiﬁed dominance regions. It is possible to prove that agent 1’s
best response to such strategies is a strategy that considers playing 0 when x1 <x 1
and playing 1 when x1 > x1 where x <x 1 and x>x1. In other words, in equilibrium,
the regions where 0 and 1 are played has been extended. Given the symmetry of the
problem, all the agents perform the same analysis and consequently the regions where
0 and 1 are played are extended symmetrically for all the players. Iterating with this
argument, it is possible to generate increasing and decreasing sequences {xn}∞
n=1 and
{xn}∞
n=1, respectively, such that they have the same limit value, i.e., x∞ = x∞ ≡ k∗.
Finally, it is important to notice that the equilibrium proﬁle selected in G(σ) does
not depend on the size of the noise. In this sense, we say that s∗ is the unique
equilibrium of the link formation game G, which is stable to incomplete information
in the parameter x.
2.4 Eﬃcient Allocation of the Game
The eﬃcient allocation of the game E(G),i sd e ﬁned for each x as the strategy proﬁle
that maximizes the sum of the payoﬀsf o rt h ep l a y e r s .I ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h a t :
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{[0]} if x<c / (1 + α + β)
{[1]} if x>c / (1 + α + β)
and as a result, the networks supported by eﬃcient allocation E(G) coincide with
those supported by the sets SNE(G) and CPNE(G) described in ﬁgure 2.
2.5 Discussion
The example developed illustrate the main results of the paper. First, the traditional
cooperative reﬁnements do not conﬂict with the eﬃcient allocation for each level of
x. However, the equilibrium selected using the global game approach clearly conﬂicts
with eﬃciency when c
1+α+β <x< 4c
2+4α+β. Second, in the interval c
1+α <x<
4c
2+4α+β all the cooperative reﬁnements predict the formation of the complete network,
however, our selected equilibrium predicts the empty network. This means that, for
these values of x, it is impossible to satisfy the two stability conditions simultaneously.
Giving that each stability notion leads to the selection of a diﬀerent equilibrium, we
have two implications. First, the cooperative reﬁnements are not robust to incomplete
information. Second, the feasibility of the equilibrium selected by each approach
depends critically on the feasibility of the deviations considered in each stability
13condition. For example, if the agents are not able to cooperate in a link formation
game, then it does not seem reasonable to select the equilibrium using a cooperative
reﬁnement and the global game approach could be more adequate.
In what follows we are going to show that these ﬁndings hold in a much more gen-
eral setting deﬁned by a family of payoﬀ functions that satisﬁes a set of assumptions.
3 Some Preliminaries in Network Theory
The goal of this section is to provide some basic concepts and notation in network
theory so that we will be able to discuss the insights of the paper in relation to the
existing literature and using the standard language in the ﬁeld.
3.1 Basic Background in Network Theory
Several authors have studied the theoretical foundations of network formation and its
properties. Particular emphasis has been given to study the link formation process
and the conﬂict between stability and eﬃciency in networks. The link formation
literature precedes the stability/eﬃciency literature, however, the insights from the
latter area have interacted and motivated more research in the former.
In the link formation literature, an important starting point is Myerson (1977)
who departs from the traditional cooperative game theory imposing networks con-
straints to the role of the diﬀerent agents in a coalition. Aumann and Myerson (1988)
studied a particular link formation game in extensive form where the agents itera-
tively decide to oﬀer or sever links to the others. This sequence of decisions proceeds
in diﬀerent rounds until no one wants to modify the selection of the previous round.
They characterize the resulting networks as the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of
the game. Most recently, Dutta, van den Noweland and Tijs (1998) studied a link
formation game in strategic form and showed that the resulting networks diﬀer from
14those of Aumann and Myerson (1988). The strategic form approach of the link forma-
tion game was ﬁrst proposed by Myerson (1991). The idea is that each player select a
list of the other players he wants to form a link with. Then the lists are put together
and if the link ij is required by both parts then it is formed. Given the nature of the
game, subgame perfection does not apply. Dutta, van den Noweland and Tijs (1998)
used cooperative reﬁnements to select among the multiplicity of Nash Equilibria of
the game. Slikker and van den Noweland (2000) introduced a cost to establish links
and showed that, in the game in extensive form of Aumann and Myerson, a decrease
in this cost does not necessarily increase the number of links in equilibrium.
The study of the conﬂict between stability and eﬃciency of networks began with
the paper of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). This is a very important paper because
they are the ﬁrst to assign value directly to the network rather than to the coalition.
This fact allows us to have diﬀerent values for the same coalition depending on how
the agents are connected.10 In particular, this approach encompasses the case studied
by Slikker and van den Noweland (2000). The focus of their paper is not on link
formation but the conﬂict between stability and eﬃciency, where the stability notion
they introduce is pairwise stability (PS)11 and the eﬃciency notion is strong eﬃciency.
Under PS they consider only the incentives of each pair of agents to form or sever
one link and under strong eﬃciency the value of the network is maximized.12 Their
main result is that an anonymous and component balanced allocation rule does not
exist13 such that at least one strongly eﬃcient graph is pairwise stable for every value
function over the network. Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) adopt a mechanism design
10Technically, if the network is denoted by g, then the value function is denoted by v(g).
11As Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) say, this concept is a weak notion of stability and it has been
considered as a necessary condition.
12Jackson (2001) shows that the concept of eﬃciency could vary across problems depending on
the degree of transferability of the value generated by the network.
13The allocation rule describes how the value of each network is distributed to the players. For
af o r m a ld e ﬁnition of the anonymity and component balance properties see Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996).
15approach to deal with the conﬂict between eﬃciency and stability. They show that, in
some particular environments, it is possible to reconcile stability and eﬃciency with
an adequate design of the allocation rule.
It is important to note how the discussion about the conﬂict between eﬃciency
and stability has aﬀected the modeling of the link formation game, which is the
focus of this paper. The main relation is through the concept of stability. When
we specify a game that model how the network forms, we can say that the Nash
equilibria of the game satisfy, by deﬁnition, a stability condition; no one wants to
unilaterally deviate from the equilibrium. However, this notion usually generates a
multiplicity of equilibria supporting a multiplicity of networks structures, which lead
us to consider some reﬁnements. The pertinent kind of reﬁnement depends on how
we specify the game. For example, Aumann and Myerson (1988) used the subgame
perfect equilibrium concept for their link formation game in extensive form. On the
other hand, Dutta, van den Noweland and Tijs (1998) consider two kind of reﬁnements
for their strategic form game, the Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE) and the Coalition
Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE). Both of them are indeed stability concepts where
the idea is to select the equilibria that survives against the possibility of deviations
by coalitions. The ﬁrst concept, however, is too demanding and it could be the case
that the set of SNE is empty. Consequently, they use the CPNE as the concept of
stability in networks and, therefore, as the relevant reﬁnement in the link formation
game. The pairwise stability notion of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) has been argued
to have an advantage because it is independent of the way that the link formation
game is modeled. Although this is a weak notion of stability, it is enough to generate
conﬂict between eﬃciency and stability and even more, there are situations where no
pairwise stable network exists.14
14However, if the allocation rule is given by the Myerson value, there always exist a pairwise stable
network.
16In this paper we focus on the link formation game in strategic form of Dutta,
van den Noweland and Tijs (1998) but we introduce a diﬀerent, non cooperative,
equilibrium selection approach. Our approach is in fact based on a diﬀerent stability
notion and consequently, we can analyze the properties of the selected equilibria and
compare them with those from the cooperative results. We also discuss the traditional
stability/eﬃciency conﬂict when our stability notion is being used.
3.2 Basic Notation in Network Theory
Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we establish some basic notation concerning
graphs.
Let N = {1,...,N+1 } be a ﬁnite set of players. The complete graph, denoted
by gN+1, is the set of all subsets of N of size 2. The set of all possible graphs on N
is {g/g ⊆ gN+1}. Let the link ij denotes the subset of N containing only i and j.
We understand that ij ∈ g if and only if the nodes i and j are directly connected.
Moreover, we denote g + ij = g ∪ {ij} and g − ij = g\{ij}.
Let N(g)={i/∃j s.t ij ∈ g} be the set of non isolated nodes and n(g) be the
cardinality of N(g).A path in g connecting i1 and in is a set of distinct nodes
{i1,...,in} ⊆ N(g) such that {i1i2,i 2i3...,in−1in} ⊆ g.
The graph g0 ⊂ g is a component of g,i ff o ra l li ∈ N(g0) and j ∈ N(g0),w i t h
i 6= j, there exist a path in g0 connecting i and j,a n df o ra n yi ∈ N(g0) and j ∈ N(g),
ij ∈ g implies ij ∈ g0.
The value of a graph is represented by the function v : {g/g ⊆ gN+1} → IR.T h e
set of all such functions is denoted by V . In some applications the value function is
naturally deﬁned as an aggregation of individual payoﬀs functions, v(g)=
P
i πi(g),
where πi : {g/g ⊆ gN+1} → IR is player i’s payoﬀ.
Ag r a p hg ∈ {g/g ⊆ gN+1} is strongly eﬃcient if v(g) ≥ v(g0) ∀g0 ∈ {g/g ⊆ gN+1}
17An allocation rule Y : {g/g ⊆ gN+1}×V → IR
N+1 is a rule that describes how the
value of a graph is distributed to the individual players. Yi(g,v) is the payoﬀ to player
i from graph g under the value function v. In some speciﬁc contexts, as the one studied
in this paper, the allocation rule fails to redistribute wealth, so Yi(g,v)=πi(g).
With this concepts in mind we will be able to interpret our assumptions and results
using the standard language of network theory.
4 The Link Formation Game
Consider the following general setup for an N +1person game G. There exists N +1
players indexed by i, each player has a set of strategies Ai = {0,1}N .A s t r a t e g y
for player i is a column vector of zeros and ones which identify the set of players he
wants to form links with. A link between two players will be formed if and only if
both players want to form the link. For example, if players’ strategies are such that
ai =( ...,aij =1 ,a ik =1 ,...)t,a j =( ...,aji =0 ,a jk =1 ,...)t, ak =( ...,aki =0 ,a kj =





deﬁnes the graph g formed according to:
g(a)={ij ⊆ g
N+1 /a ij =1 , aji =1 } (2)
With this notation, we are allowing the case that two or more diﬀerent strategy
proﬁles can deﬁne the same network. For example, it could be the case that g(a)=
g(a0) with a 6= a0,a n dt h e s ep r o ﬁles generate diﬀerent values for the individual’s
payoﬀ functions. For this reason we consider the payoﬀ function πi : A → IR and we




For simplicity we will assume symmetric players with a payoﬀ function given by
18π(ai,a −i,x) where ai ∈ Ai, a−i ∈ A−i = ×j6=iAj,15 and x ∈ [X,X] ⊂ IR is an
exogenous variable. We deﬁne ∆π(ai,a 0
i;a−i,x)=π(ai,a −i,x)−π(a0
i,a −i,x) as agent
i’s payoﬀ diﬀerence when he changes from action a0
i to action ai.
Deﬁne An
i ⊂ Ai such that, if ai ∈ An
i then ai is N-dimensional vector which contain










i = ∅ for all n and n0 ∈ {0...N} with
n 6= n0. Additionally, it is easy to see that AN
i and A0
i are singleton, therefore if ai ∈
AN
i then ai =( 1 ,1,1,...,1)t ≡ 1, and it is deﬁned as the highest action vector. If
ai ∈ A0
i then ai =( 0 ,0,0,...,0)t ≡ 0 is the lowest action vector. If ai ∈ {1,0} ⊂ Ai,
then ai is an homogenous action vector, and Ah
i ≡ A0
i ∪ AN
i = {1,0} is deﬁned as
players i’ set of homogenous actions.
Similarly consider Ah
−i = ×j6=iAh
j and deﬁne A
h,n
−i such that if Mn is an element
of A
h,n
−i , then Mn is N × N matrix containing n columns 1 and N − n columns 0.



















−i = ∅ for all n and n0 ∈ {0...N} with n 6= n0. In
particular MN =[ 1] is a N × N matrix of ones, and M0 =[ 0] is a N × N matrix of
zeros.
Let us consider the following assumptions in the payoﬀ structure:
(A1). Increasing Diﬀerences (ID). Conditional on the value of the exogenous
parameter x, the greater the other players’ action proﬁle the greater is player i’s
incentive to choose a higher action:
∀ai ∈ Ai and ∀a−i ∈ A−i
15Ai is a partially ordered set:
ai ≥ a0
i if ∀j 6= ia ij ≥a0
ij
ai >a 0
i if ∀j 6= ia ij ≥a0
ij and aij >a 0
ij for some j
I nt h es a m ew a yA−i is a partially ordered set:
a−i ≥ a0
−i if ∀j 6= ia j ≥a0
j
a−i >a 0
−i if ∀j 6= ia j ≥a0
j and aj >a 0
j for some j
19If ai ≥ a0
i and a−i ≥ a0
−i, ∆π(ai,a 0








−i ≥ a−i+eki, and eki is a N ×N matrix of 0, except the kielement which
is 1.
b. ∀ai 6= 1, ∃ k 6= i with aik =0 . So if aki =1then:
∆π(1,a i;a−i,x) > ∆π(1,a i;a0
−i,x) ∀x
where a0
−i ≤ a−i − eki
(A2). Continuity (C).
π(ai,a −i,x) is a continuous function in x
(A3). Monotonicity (M). T h eg r e a t e rt h ev a l u eo ft h ee x o g e n o u sp a r a m e t e r
x,t h eg r e a t e ri sp l a y e ri’s incentive to choose a higher action:
∃ c>0 s.t. ∀ai >a 0
i ∀a−i and x, x0 ∈ [X,X] x>x 0
∆π(ai,a 0
i;a−i,x) − ∆π(ai,a 0
i;a−i,x 0) >ckai − a0
ik(x − x0)
(A4). Links Symmetry (LS). Player i’s incentive to deviate from an homoge-
nous action depends on the number of links requested by each player and on the
structure of the resulting network, rather than on the identities of the players:





















i;a−i,x) ∀n,n0 =0 ,...,N
It is important to notice that the role of network structure is incorporated through
the summation over a−i ∈ A
h,n
−i .
b. Moreover, the value of the incentive to deviate from the homogenous action 0 to
any other action ai varies proportionally with the elemental deviation that establishes
20just one link intention:
∃ λ : Ai → [0,∞) satisfying λ(0)=0and λ(ai)=1 ∀ai ∈ A1






i) ⇔ n>n 0,
λ(ai)=λ(a0
i) ⇔ n = n0













(A5). Upper and Lower Indiﬀerence Signals (IS). If all other players are
choosing the highest (lowest) action, there exists a unique value of x such that player
i is indiﬀerent between the lowest (highest) action and any other action.
∀ai ∈ Ai
∃! x >Xs.t. ∆π(ai,0;a−i =[ 1],x)=0 ,a n d
∃! x s.t. X>x>xs.t. ∆π(1,a i;a−i =[ 0],x)=0
Assumptions A1 (ID) parts a) and b) are required because we will need increasing
diﬀerences being satisﬁed strictly under some circumstances. In A1 (ID) a, player i
has link intention with player k but it is not reciprocal (aik =1but aki =0 ). Then
if k changes his strategy to request now a link with i and all the agents others than
i are playing higher strategies (a0
−i ≥ a−i + eki), then player i’s incentive to choose
the original ai is strictly higher. Intuitively,16 in terms of our network notation, we
are roughly saying that ∆π(g(a)) < ∆π(g(a)+ik) ≤ ∆π(g0),w h e r eg(a)+ik ⊆ g0.
The intuition for A1 (ID) b is analogous.
Another important remark is that assumptions A1 (ID), A3 (M) and A5 (IS)
16This interpretation is not precise, because the same network can be supported by diﬀerent
strategy proﬁles generating diﬀerent payoﬀs. However, the intuition is the same.
21provide suﬃcient conditions for the existence of dominance regions, along which each
action is strictly dominant, providing this setup with the necessary global game struc-
ture. i.e.
∀x<x , ∆π(ai,0;a−i,x) < 0 ∀a ∈ A,a n d
∀x>x, ∆π(1,a i;a−i,x) > 0 ∀a ∈ A
Finally, the following lemmas will be useful in the characterization of the equilib-
rium.

























Lemma 2: The values of x and x are independent of ai.
proof : It is a direct application of assumption A4 (LS) b.
5 Equilibrium Selection using Cooperative Reﬁnements
In this section we are interested in applying some of the most commonly used sta-
bility concepts to our problem in order to reﬁne the multiplicity of Nash equilibria
that can arise in our game. Three concepts have been proposed: Pairwise Stabil-
ity (PS), Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) and Strong Nash Equilibrium
(SNE). These reﬁnements are based in cooperative game theory, mainly because in
the application to networks when we consider deviations from the Nash equilibrium,
we must include the possibility of adding links, which requires the agreement of both
parties. In what follows we provide a formal deﬁnition of each concept and we apply
them to our problem.
225.1 Deﬁnitions
The graph g is pairwise stable with respect to the value function v and the allocation
rule Y if:
(i) For all ij ∈ g, Yi(g,v) ≥ Yi(g − ij,v) and Yj(g,v) ≥ Yj(g − ij,v)
and
(ii) For all ij / ∈ g,i fYi(g,v) <Y i(g + ij,v) then Yj(g,v) >Y j(g + ij,v)
The concept of pairwise stability is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and it
is directly deﬁned over the networks, independently of the link formation process. It
says that the network will be pairwise stable when each pair of agents do not have
incentives to add or sever a link. It is clear from the deﬁnition that adding a link
requires both parties to agree, but any agent can sever a link unilaterally.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) claimed that pairwise stability has the advantage
that it is independent of the formation process of the network, so no matter how the
network is formed, pairwise stability will be meaningful. On the other hand, it has
the disadvantage that it can be understood as a necessary condition for stability, but
it is not suﬃcient because the concept does not consider either deviations of a bigger
coalition of players or deviations where one player would want to add or sever more
than one link. This inconvenience has motivated the introduction of stronger notions.
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle is called a Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE) if it is a Nash equi-
librium and there is no coalition of players that can strictly increase the payoﬀso fa l l
its members using a joint deviation (Aumann (1959)). We are going to talk about
Strong Stability to refer the case where the network g is formed by a SNE of the game.
Formally, let Γ =( N,{Ai}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N) be a game in strategic form. A strategy




Ai is a Strong Nash Equilibrium (SNE) of Γ if there is no T ⊆ N
and a ∈ A such that:
23(i) ai = a∗
i ∀i/ ∈ T
(ii) ui(a) >u i(a∗) ∀i ∈ T
The claimed advantage of this concept is that it can be understood as the strongest
stability notion. Consequently when a network g is strongly stable it is virtually
impossible to destabilize. The disadvantage, unfortunately is that an SNE does not
always exist (see Slikker and van den Noweland (2000)). As a result, a weaker notion
of stability is required.
In order to deﬁne the coalition proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) we need some extra
notation. Consider the game in strategic form Γ =( N,{Ai}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N) as above.
For every subset of players T ⊂ N and a ﬁxed strategy proﬁle ˆ aN\T ∈ AN\T for the
players who do not belong to T,l e tΓ(ˆ aN\T) be the game induced on the players of





where for all i ∈ T, u∗
i : AT → IR is given by u∗
i(aT) ≡ ui(aT,ˆ aN\T) for all
aT ∈ AT.
Now coalition proof Nash equilibria is deﬁned inductively. In a one player game
with player set N = {i}, ˆ ai ∈ Ai = A is a CPNE of the game Γ =( {i},A i,u i) if
ˆ ai maximizes ui over Ai. Consider now a game Γ with n>1 players. By induction,
the CPNE has been deﬁn e df o rg a m e sw i t hl e s st h a nn players. Using this induction
hypothesis, we say that a strategy proﬁle ˆ a ∈ AN is self enforcing if for all T ⊂ N, ˆ aT
is a CPNE of Γ(ˆ aN\T). Then, the strategy vector ˆ a is a CPNE of Γ if ˆ a is self enforcing
and there is no other self enforcing strategy proﬁle a ∈ AN with ui(a) >u i(ˆ a) for all
i ∈ N.
As in SNE, the CPNE demands that no coalition can deviate to a proﬁle that
strictly improves the payoﬀs of all the players in the coalition. However, in the CPNE
24the set of admissible deviations is smaller, because the deviation has to be stable with
respect to further deviations by subcoalitions.
The advantage of this notion is that it is easier to satisfy than SNE. Even more,
Slikker and van den Noweland (2000) have proved that in a three players game a
CPNE always exists. The disadvantage is that a CPNE could be very diﬃcult to ﬁnd
depending on the particular game.
I th a sb e e np r o v e dt h a t , 17 for a general link formation game Γ under complete
information, 18:
SNE(Γ) ⊆ PS(Γ) ⊆ NE(Γ) (3)
SNE(Γ) ⊆ CPNE(Γ) ⊆ NE(Γ)
Finally, the set of Eﬃcient Allocations of a game Γ, E(Γ), is deﬁned as:
E(Γ)={a






It is clear that any a∗ ∈ E(Γ) deﬁnes a strongly eﬃcient graph g(a∗) ∈ G through-
out (2). An important implication of the theoretical conﬂict between eﬃciency and
stability is that, in general, E(Γ) * PS(Γ) and E(Γ) * CPNE(Γ).19 We are going
to show that this is not the case in our game.
17See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Dutta and Mutuswami (1997)
18Even when Pairwise Stability has been deﬁned over graphs, we can talk about the set PS(Γ) as
the subset of Nash Equilibria leading to pairwise stable graphs through (2).
19See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), respectively.
255.2 The Cooperative Reﬁnements
Consider the link formation game in strategic form deﬁned in section 4 and satisfying
the assumptions A1 to A5. In addition, we introduce the following assumption:
(A6). Status Quo Payoﬀ (SQP)
π(0,a −i,x)=0 ∀a−i ∈ A−i , ∀x ∈ [X,X]
This assumption is very natural in the sense that if agent i does not require any
link, then he has neither beneﬁts nor costs. The role of assumption A6 (SQP) is to
permit us to write ∆π(ai,0;a−i,x)=π(ai,a −i,x) so that all the assumptions over
∆π can be directly interpreted in terms of π.
Under this general set of assumptions it is not easy to give a detailed description
of the set of Nash equilibria of the game. However, it is possible to show that some
particular proﬁles are indeed Nash Equilibria, and even more, we can show that these
equilibria are stable under the traditional cooperative reﬁnements. In addition, we
will show that the set E(G) is always stable under the diﬀerent cooperative notions.
Proposition 2: Consider the link formation game G. Under assumptions A1 to
A6 we have:







b. If a ∈ E(G) then a is stable under all the cooperative reﬁnements.
Proposition 2 shows that in the class of supermodular games deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n4
under assumptions A1 to A6 there is no conﬂict between eﬃciency and the cooperative
notions of stability.
266 Equilibrium Selection using the Global Game Approach
S u p p o s en o wt h a tt h eg a m ei so n eo fi n c o m p l e t ei n f o r m a t i o ni nt h ep a y o ﬀ structure.
Instead of observing the actual value of x, each player just observes a private signal
xi, which contains diﬀuse information about x. We assume that this is a game of
private values, where each player gets utility directly from the signal rather than the
actual value of the variable.20
T h es i g n a lh a st h ef o l l o w i n gs t r u c t u r e :xi = x+σεi ,where σ>0 is a scale factor,
x is drawn from the interval [X,X] with uniform density, and εi is a random variable
distributed according to a continuous density φ with support in the interval [−1
2, 1
2].
We assume εi is i.i.d. across the individuals.
This general noise structure has been used in the global game literature, allowing
us to model in a simple way the conditional distribution of the opponents signal, i.e.
given a player’s own signal, the conditional distribution of an opponent’s signal xj
admits a continuous density fσ and a cdf Fσ with support in the interval [xi−σ,xi+σ].
Moreover this literature establishes a signiﬁcant result: when the prior is uniform,
players’ posterior beliefs about the diﬀerence between their own observation and other
players’ observations are the same, i.e. Fσ(xi | xj)=1− Fσ(xj | xi).21
In this context of incomplete information, a Bayesian pure strategy for a player
iis a function si :[ X − σ
2,X + σ
2] → Ai, and s =( s1,s 2,...,sN) is a pure strategy
proﬁle, where si ∈ Si. Equivalently we deﬁne s−i =( s1,s 2,..si−1,s i+1,...s N) ∈ S−i.
In particular, a switching strategy between the lowest and the highest action is a
Bayesian pure strategy satisfying : ∃ ki s.t.
20Even though we have not proven that our main result is robust to this assumption, it is simple
to model the private value case as a limit of the common values case (when players derive utilitity
from the actual value of the variable) as the noise goes to zero (σ → 0). This approach has been
used in the global game literature. (Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (2000) and
Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2002).)
21This property holds approximately when x is not distributed with uniform density but σ is





1 if xi >k i
0 if xi <k i
Abusing notation, we write si(·;ki) to denote the switching strategy with threshold
ki.
Finally, if player i is observing a signal xi and facing a strategy s−i his expected
payoﬀ can be written as
Πi(ai,s −i,x i | xi)=
Z
x−i
π(ai,s −i(x−i),x i)dFσ(−i)(x−i | xi)
Calling this game of incomplete information G(σ), let us deﬁne BNE(G(σ)) as
the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of G(σ). In addition, we assume:
(A7). Single Crossing (SC). There exists a unique value k∗,of the exogenous
variable such that if player i receive a signal xi = k∗ and he believes that all other
players are using a switching strategy between 0 and 1 with threshold k∗, the expected
value of his payoﬀsw h e nh ec h o o s e s0 or 1 are the same:










One of the main results of the paper proves that G(σ) has a unique proﬁle s∗,
played in equilibrium ∀σ>0, and in this proﬁle every player will play a switching
strategy si(·;k∗) with k∗ a c c o r d i n gA 7( S C ) .
Proposition 3: Consider the link formation game G(σ). Under assumptions A1
to A5 and A7:
∀ σ>0 there exists a unique strategy proﬁle s∗ surviving iterated elimination of








1 if xi >k ∗
0 if xi <k ∗
∀ia n d x <k
∗ < x
The equilibrium strategy deﬁnes a unique k∗ satisfying that ∀xi <k ∗ each player
chooses the action vector that shows link intention with nobody, and ∀xi >k ∗ each
player choose the action vector that shows link intention with everybody. It is im-
portant to notice that the equilibrium proﬁle selected does not depend on the size of
the noise σ, and it does not depend on the noise structure φ either. We have assumed
that the parameter x is distributed according to a ﬂat prior, but it is possible to
prove that any prior can be treated as a ﬂat prior when σ goes to zero. In this sense,
we say that s∗ is the unique equilibrium of the link formation game G, which is robust
to incomplete information in the parameter x.
Even though the proposition proves that when σ>0 each player is using a
switching strategy s∗
i, the network formed depends on the size of the noise. In
general, if some xi >k ∗ + σ then every player receives a signal greater than k∗ and
therefore the complete network is formed. Equivalently if some xi <k ∗−σ the empty
network is formed, but if some xi ∈ [k∗ − σ,k∗ + σ] any network can be formed de-
pending on the realization of every player’s signal. Following this analysis is easy to
see that as σ goes to zero just two possibilities remain, the complete and the empty
networks.
7A p p l i c a t i o n
As an example of the previous result, in this section we develop an application using
ap a r t i c u l a rp a y o ﬀ structure. We consider a N +1player link formation game, such












+( αx − c)aij
)
(5)
which is a generalization of the payoﬀ function described in equation (1). The
interpretation of the diﬀerent components of this function (independent, direct and
indirect beneﬁts) is the same as in section 2, where we interpreted it as the investment
in R&D to reduce variable costs.
It is also clear that the game played is diﬀerent depending on the values of x.I n
particular, when x(1 + α + β) <ca dominant strategy for any agent i is to play
aij =0 ∀i,j ∈ {1,...,N +1}, i 6= j, forming the empty network. On the other hand,
when αx > c, then a dominant strategy is to play aij =1 ∀i,j ∈ {1,...,N +1 },
i 6= j,f o r m i n gt h ec o m p l e t en e t w o r k .
Assumption A6 (SQP) holds trivially, while assumptions A1 to A5 can be directly
checked as follows: the general statement for assumption A1 (ID) holds because the
payoﬀ function is supermodular in a and then, in particular, increasing diﬀerences is
satisﬁed. (A1a) and (A1b) are satisﬁed due to the presence of a direct beneﬁt x when
the link exists. Assumptions A2 (C) and A3 (M) follow because the payoﬀ function is
“well behaved”.Assumption (A4a) follows directly by the symmetry of the problem,
while assumption (A4b) holds with λ(ai)=
P
j6=i aij. Finally, assumption A5 (IS)
holds with x = c
(1+α+β) and x = c
α.
The problem of applying the diﬀerent equilibrium selection approaches is reduced
to verify assumption A7 (SC), which is done in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Consider the link formation game G when the payoﬀ function






































Proposition 4 permits us to apply the equilibrium selection by the global game
approach to the payoﬀ function deﬁned by (5). The equilibrium selected generalizes








 =2 N would permit us to simplify equation (6), how-
ever, the original formulation is more convenient to verify that c
1+α <k ∗ < c
α.N o t i n g
that x = c
(1+α+β) then it is easy to see that the conﬂict between the equilibrium selec-
tion by cooperative concepts and the global game approach applies to this particular
payoﬀ function.
8C o n c l u s i o n
The goal of this paper is to use a non cooperative equilibrium selection approach as
a notion of stability in link formation games. Speciﬁcally, we study the link forma-
tion game in strategic form of Dutta, Van den Noweland and Tijs (1998) where we
constrain the payoﬀs to a class of supermodular functions deﬁned by assumptions
A1 to A5. Assumption A6 (SQP) is introduced to apply the traditional cooperative
reﬁnements and assumption A7 (SC) is introduced to apply the global game approach.
Our methodology is based on the global game theory, where the equilibrium selec-
tion is obtained through perturbations by allowing some arbitrarily small uncertainty
in the payoﬀ structure. Interestingly, the equilibrium selected with our stability con-
cept is not only diﬀerent, but is also in conﬂict with those predicted by the traditional
31cooperative reﬁnements. As a consequence, a ﬁrst insight of this paper is to show
that the equilibria selected under the cooperative notions of stability are not robust
to incomplete information.
In Proposition 2 we show that the set of Eﬃcient Allocations is contained in the set
of stable equilibria when the stability notions are cooperative. In other words, in our
link formation game when the payoﬀ functions belong to our class of supermodular
functions, we do not have a conﬂict between stability and eﬃciency when cooperative
reﬁnements are used. On the contrary, from Proposition 3, we have that the conﬂict
appears when our equilibrium selection technique is used.
From an applied point of view, the paper highlights the importance of two stan-
dard assumptions in the link formation literature. First, the assumption of complete
information can be the origin of the multiplicity of networks supported by Nash Equi-
libria in link formation games. This multiplicity disappears in our environment under
incomplete information because, from Proposition 3, there is a unique strategy proﬁle
that survives the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies and then any
additional reﬁnement is meaningless. Second, the possibility of cooperation among
coalitions of agents seems to be a strong assumption in a link formation game. This
observation, and the conﬂict between the equilibria selected under a cooperative and
a global game approach, raise some doubts about which criteria is satisﬁed by the
forming networks in reality.
In the three player example discussed in section 2, in the interval c
1+α <x<
4c
2+4α+β, all the cooperative reﬁnements predict the formation of the complete network,
however, our approach predicts the formation of the empty network. In particular,
pairwise stability implies that a couple of agents can be strictly better oﬀ if they
cooperate, however the strategies required to support this behavior do not survive
the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies under any level of incomplete
i n f o r m a t i o ni nt h ep a r a m e t e rx.
32Finally, the conﬂict between eﬃciency and stability in networks under our global
game approach could have some practical implications in the dynamic formation and
destruction of markets. For example, if x is a variable aﬀecting the beneﬁts of the ﬁrms
in a market under formation, then the ﬁrms would enter the market (or would form the
network) at ineﬃciently high value of x. In a related paper we are studying the entry-
exit decisions when the payoﬀ function of the ﬁrm belongs to our supermodular class
and the possibilities of cooperation are constrained to the “insiders” of the market.
In such an environment we expect to have diﬀerent trigger values of x aﬀecting entry
and exit decisions in equilibrium.
339 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
(b) First we have to prove that a =[ 0] and a =[ 1] are indeed Nash Equilibria of
t h eg a m ew h e nx<xand x>xrespectively.
Consider ﬁrst x>xand ai 6= 1.B yA 3( M )w eh a v e :
∆π(ai,0;a−i =[ 1],x) − ∆π(ai,0;a−i =[ 1],x) >ckai − 0k(x − x) > 0
and by A5 (IS) ∆π(ai,0;a−i =[ 1],x)=0 ,s o∆π(ai,0;a−i =[ 1],x) > 0.
On the other hand, by A4 (LS) we have:
∆π(1,0;a−i =[ 1],x)=
λ(1)
λ(ai)∆π(ai,0;a−i =[ 1],x) > ∆π(ai,0;a−i =[ 1],x)
Finally, using A6 (SQP) this means:
π(1;a−i =[ 1],x) >π (ai;a−i =[ 1],x) ∀ai 6= 1,x>x. (7)
In other words, when the others are playing a−i =[ 1],t h e np l a yai = 1 is a strict
best response. As a result, a =[ 1] is a strict NE of the game when x>x .
N o ww ea r eg o i n gt op r o v et h a ta =[ 1] is a SNE o ft h eg a m ew h e nx>xand then,
by relations in (3), it is an stable equilibria under all the cooperative reﬁnements.
We are going to prove that:
π(1;[1],x) ≥ π(ai;a−i,x) ∀ x>x , ∀a ∈ A, a 6=[ 1]
which is a condition that implies that the strategy proﬁle a =[ 1] i saS t r o n gN a s h
Equilibrium (SNE).
Consider any a ∈ A, a 6=[ 1] and any x>x .B yA 1( I D )a n dA 6( S Q P )w eh a v e :
π(ai;a−i,x)=∆π(ai,0;a−i,x) ≤ ∆π(ai,0;[1],x)=π(ai;[1],x)
and using equation (7) we have:
π(ai;[1],x) ≤ π(1;[1],x)
which completes the proof that a =[ 1] is a SNE o ft h eg a m ew h e nx>x .
34N o ww ea n a l y z et h ec a s ex<x . In this case, the strategy ai = 0 is a strictly
dominant strategy for player i because ∀ai 6= 0 and ∀a−i ∈ A−i,b yA 1( I D ) ,A 3( M )
and A5 (IS) we have:
∆π(ai,0;a−i,x) ≤ ∆π(ai,0;a−i =[ 1],x) < ∆π(ai,0;a−i =[ 1],x)=0
and using A6 (SQP):
π(ai;a−i,x) < 0=π(0;a−i,x)
In particular, considering a−i =[ 0], we obtain that a =[ 0] is a strict NE of the
game when x<x .
Moreover, given any strategy proﬁle a 6=[ 0] (not necessarily a Nash equilibrium)
and any x<xwe have:
π(0;a−i =[ 0],x) ≥ π(ai;a−i,x) and then a =[ 0] is a SNE of the game.
Finally, when x = x,t h es t r a t e g yp r o ﬁles a =[ 0] and a =[ 1] lead to a payoﬀ
zero (by assumptions A6 (SQP) and A5 (IS) respectively), and using A1 (ID) and A5
(IS), for any strategy proﬁle a ∈ A:
π(ai;a−i,x) ≤ π(1;a−i =[ 1],x)=0
As a consequence there is no proﬁtable deviation for player i from a =[ 0] or
a =[ 1],s ot h e s ep r o ﬁles are Nash Equilibria. Using the same assumptions, there is
no other proﬁle where all the players in a coalition can obtain a positive payoﬀ and,
consequently, these proﬁles are also Strong Nash Equilibria. Moreover, if there exists
any other eﬃcient strategy proﬁle under x = x, the payoﬀ for any player i would be
zero and then, it would also be a SNE of the game.
(a) By deﬁnition, the set of Eﬃcient Allocations of the game G is given by the






From the proof of part (b), we know that, when x>x ,.the strategy proﬁle a =[ 1]
35is a Nash equilibrium satisfying:
πi(1;[1],x) ≥ πi(ai;a−i,x) ∀ x>x, a 6=[ 1], i =1 ...N +1
But if the strategy proﬁle a 6=[ 1] then there exists j so that aj 6= 1 and for this
agent, using A6 (SQP), A1 (ID) and A4 (LS) we have:
πj(aj;a−j,x) ≤ πj(aj;[1],x) <π j(1;[1],x) ∀ x>x
and then the unique Eﬃcient Allocation when x>xis given by the strategy
proﬁle a =[ 1].
An analogous argument leads us to prove that the unique Eﬃcient Allocation
when x<xis given by the strategy proﬁle a =[ 0].¥
Proof of Proposition 3
Denoting Sn
i the player i’s set of strategies that survives n rounds of deletion of
interim strictly dominated strategies, the process of iterated elimination is deﬁned
recursively as follows: set S0















i(xi),s −i,x i | xi) ≥ Π(si(xi),s −i,x i | xi) ∀xi






Consider a link formation game G(σ). U n d e ra s s u m p t i o n sA 1t oA 5a n dA 7 ,w e
will argue by induction that set Sn
i satisﬁes:
Sn
i = {si : si(xi)=0 if xi <x n and si(xi)=1 if xi > xn},
where xi and xi are deﬁned recursively as
xn=max{x : ∆Π(1,0;(sj(xj;xn−1))j6=i,x)=0 }
xn=min{x : ∆Π(1,0;(sj(xj;xn−1))j6=i,x)=0 }
The ﬁrst round of elimination is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 3: For all i ∃ x1 >xand x1 < x s.t.
si ∈ S1
i iff si(xi)={0 if xi <x 1 and 1 if xi > x1}
36where
x
1=max{x : ∆Π(1,0;(sj(xj;x))j6=i,x)=0 }
x
1=min{x : ∆Π(1,0;(sj(xj;x))j6=i,x)=0 }
proof . Starting from the left: Player i (henceforth Pi) receive a signal xi = x, from
A1 (ID), if si is a best response to a proﬁle where every player is choosing a switching
strategy sj(·;x) ∀j 6= i, it will be a best response to any s−i ∈ S0
−i.T h e n p l a y e r i’












where in general Pr(a−i | (s−i,x) represent player i’ beliefs about the action proﬁle
a−i conditional on other players’ strategy s−i.
Now, since, ∀σ>0, ∀a−i ∈ Ah









By assuimptions A1 (ID) and A5 (IS) ∀ai ∈ Ai, ∀a−i ∈ Ah
−i ∆π(ai,0;a−i,x) ≤
0. By assumption A1 (ID) part a, at least one element is strictly negative, then
37∆Π(ai,0;(sj(xj;x))j6=i,x) < 0. Therefore Pi, upon receiving signal xi = x, will play
action ai = 0.
Now, if Pi receive a signal xi = x + σ
∆Π(ai,0;(sj(xj;x))j6=i,x+ σ)=∆π(ai,0;s−i =[ 1],x i = x + σ)
By assumption A3 (M) ∆π(ai,0;[1],x+ σ) > ∆π(ai,0;[1],x i = x), and by
assumptions A5 (IS) ∆π(ai,0;[1],x i = x)=0 . Then ∆π(ai,0;[1],x i = x + σ) > 0.
Given continuity of the expected utility function and using the intermediate value
theorem:







and from Lemma 2, we know that x1 is independent of ai.T h e ni np a r t i c u l a ri f
ai = 1
x
1 =m i n{x | ∆Π(1,0;(sj(xj;x))j6=i,x)=0 }
Starting from the right and using an equivalent argument we conclude that:





∆π(1,a i;a−i,x)Pr(a−i | (sj(xj;x))j6=i,x)=0
(9)
From Lemma 2, we know that x1 is independent of ai. Then in particular if
38ai = 0
x
1 =m a x{x | ∆Π(1,0;(sj(xj;x))j6=i,x)=0 }¥Lemma 3
Repeating the process described in lemma 3, it is easy to prove by induction that
∃ xn >x n−1 and xn < xn−1 s.t.
Sn














This process generates an increasing sequence {xn} and a decreasing sequence











































Finally, it is easy to see that equations (10) and (11) are the same, and from










Proof of Proposition 4














+ N(αk∗ − c).
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